Radioisotope thermoelectric generator. RTG: prosaic heat and electricity for spacecraft

But they have no moving parts and do not require maintenance throughout their entire service life, which can be decades.

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Collection of abandoned Sr 90 beta sources from RTGs in Georgia

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Application

RTGs are applicable as energy sources for autonomous systems, remote from traditional power sources and requiring several tens to hundreds of watts with a very long operating time, too long for fuel cells or batteries.

In space

RTGs are the main source of power on spacecraft that have a long mission and move far away from the Sun (for example, Voyager 2 or Cassini-Huygens), where the use of solar panels is ineffective or impossible.

Several kilograms of 238 PuO 2 were used on some Apollo missions to power ALSEP instruments. Electricity generator SNAP-27 Systems for Nuclear Auxiliary Power), whose thermal and electrical power was 1480 W and 63.5 W, respectively, contained 3.735 kg of plutonium-238 dioxide.

On the ground

RTGs were used in navigation beacons, radio beacons, weather stations and similar equipment installed in areas where, for technical or economic reasons, it is not possible to use other power sources. In particular, in the USSR they were used as power sources for navigation equipment installed on the coast of the Arctic Ocean along the Northern Sea Route. Currently, due to the risk of leakage of radiation and radioactive materials, the practice of installing maintenance-free RTGs in inaccessible places has been stopped.

In the USA, RTGs were used not only for land-based power sources, but also for offshore buoys and underwater installations. For example, in 1988, the USSR discovered two American RTGs near Soviet communications cables in the Sea of Okhotsk. The exact number of RTGs installed by the United States is unknown; estimates from independent organizations indicated 100-150 installations in 1992.

Fuel

Radioactive materials used in RTGs must meet the following characteristics:

Sufficiently high volumetric activity to obtain significant energy release in a limited volume of the installation. The minimum volume is limited by the thermal and radiation resistance of the materials; weakly active isotopes impair the energy-mass perfection of the installation. This usually means that the half-life of the isotope must be short enough for high decay rates and the decay must produce a sufficiently large amount of easily utilized energy.
A sufficiently long period of maintaining power to complete the task. This usually means that the half-life of the isotope must be long enough for a given rate of decline in energy release. Typical half-lives of isotopes used in RTGs are several decades, although isotopes with short half-lives can be used for specialized applications.
A type of ionizing radiation convenient for energy utilization. Gamma radiation easily escapes from the structure, taking with it decay energy. Neutrons can also escape relatively easily. The high-energy electrons produced during β-decay are well retained, but this produces bremsstrahlung X-rays, which carry away some of the energy. During α-decay, massive α-particles are formed, which effectively release their energy almost at the point of formation.
A type of ionizing radiation that is safe for the environment and equipment. Significant gamma, x-ray and neutron radiation often require special design measures to protect personnel and nearby equipment.
The relative cheapness of the isotope and the ease of its production within the framework of existing nuclear technologies.

Plutonium-238 most often used in spacecraft. α-decay with an energy of 5.5 MeV (one gram gives ~0.54 W). Half-life 88 years (power loss 0.78% per year) with the formation of a highly stable isotope 234 U. Plutonium-238 is a nearly pure alpha emitter, making it one of the safest radioactive isotopes with minimal biological containment requirements. However, producing the relatively pure 238 isotope requires the operation of special reactors, which makes it expensive.

Strontium-90 widely used in ground-based RTGs of Soviet and American production. A chain of two β-decays gives a total energy of 2.8 MEV (one gram gives ~0.46 W). Half-life 29 years with the formation of a stable ⁹⁰ Zr. Strontium-90 is obtained from spent fuel from nuclear reactors in large quantities. The cheapness and abundance of this isotope determines its widespread use in ground-based equipment. Unlike plutonium, strontium has significant levels of highly permeable ionizing radiation, which places relatively high demands on biological shielding.

There is a concept of subcritical RTGs. A subcritical generator consists of a neutron source and fissile material. Neutrons from the source are captured by atoms of the fissile substance and cause their fission. The main advantage of such a generator is that the decay energy of a reaction with neutron capture can be much higher than the energy of spontaneous fission. For example, for plutonium this is 200 MeV versus 6 MeV of spontaneous fission. Accordingly, the required amount of the substance is much lower. The number of decays and radiation activity in terms of heat release are also lower. This reduces the weight and size of the generator.

Ground RTGs in Russia

During Soviet times, 1007 RTGs were manufactured for ground use. Almost all of them were made on the basis of the isotope strontium-90 (RIT-90). The fuel element is a durable, sealed, welded capsule containing the isotope. Several variants of the RIT-90 were produced with different amounts of isotope. The RTG was equipped with one or more RIT capsules, radiation shielding (often based on depleted uranium), a thermoelectric generator, a cooling radiator, a sealed housing, and electrical circuits. Types of RTGs produced in the Soviet Union:

Type	Initial activity, kCi	Thermal power, W	Electrical power, W	Efficiency, %	Weight, kg	Start year of release
Ether-MA	104	720	30	4,167	1250	1976
IED-1	465	2200	80	3,64	2500	1976
IED-2	100	580	14	2,41	600	1977
Beta-M (English) Russian	36	230	10	4,35	560	1978
Gong	47	315	18	5,714	600	1983
Horn	185	1100	60	5,455	1050	1983
IEU-2M	116	690	20	2,899	600	1985
Senostav	288	1870	-	-	1250	1989
IEU-1M	340	2200	120	5,455	2100	1990

The service life of installations can be 10-30 years, most of them have expired. An RTG poses a potential danger because it is located in a deserted area and can be stolen and then used as a dirty bomb. Cases have been recorded of RTGs being dismantled by hunters for non-ferrous metals, while the thieves themselves received a lethal dose of radiation.

Currently, the process of their dismantling and disposal is underway under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency and with funding from the United States, Norway and other countries. By the beginning of 2011, 539 RTGs had been dismantled. As of 2012, 72 RTGs are in operation, 3 are lost, 222 are in storage, 31 are in the process of disposal. Four installations were operated in Antarctica.

New RTGs for navigation needs are no longer produced; instead, wind power plants and photoelectric converters, and in some cases diesel generators, are installed. These devices are called APS (alternative power supplies). Consist of a solar panel (or wind generator), a set of maintenance-free batteries, an LED beacon (circular or folding), a programmable electronic unit that sets the algorithm for the beacon’s operation.

Requirements for RTG design

In the USSR, the requirements for RTGs were established by GOST 18696-90 “Radionuclide thermoelectric generators. Types and common technical requirements" and GOST 20250-83 “Thermoelectric radionuclide generators. Acceptance rules and test methods."

Incidents with RTGs in the CIS

date	Place
1983, March	Cape Nutevgi, Chukotka	Severe damage to the RTG on the way to the installation site. The fact of the accident was hidden by the staff and discovered by the Gosatomnadzor commission in 1997. As of 2005, this RTG was abandoned and remained at Cape Nutevgi. As of 2012, all RTGs have been removed from the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug.
1987	Cape Nizkiy, Sakhalin region.	During transportation, the helicopter dropped an IEU-1 type RTG, which belonged to the USSR Ministry of Defense, into the Sea of Okhotsk. As of 2013, search work continues, with interruptions.
1997	Tajikistan, Dushanbe	Three expired RTGs were stored, disassembled by unknown persons, in a coal warehouse in the center of Dushanbe, and an increased gamma background was recorded nearby.
1997, August	Cape Maria, Sakhalin region.	During transportation, the helicopter dropped an IEU-1 type RTG into the Sea of Okhotsk, which remained at the bottom at a depth of 25-30 m. After 10 years, it was picked up and sent for disposal.
1998, July	Korsakov port, Sakhalin region.	An RTG belonging to the Russian Ministry of Defense was found disassembled at a scrap metal collection point.
1999	Leningrad region.	The RTG was looted by non-ferrous metal hunters. A radioactive element (background near - 1000 R/h) was found at a bus stop in Kingisepp.
2000	Cape Baranikha, Chukotka	The natural background near the device was exceeded several times due to a malfunction of the RTG.
2001, May	Kandalaksha Bay, Murmansk region.	3 radioisotope sources were stolen from lighthouses on the island, which were discovered and sent to Moscow.
2002, February	Western Georgia	In the area of the village of Liya, Tsalenjikha district local residents two RTGs were found, which they used as heat sources and then dismantled. As a result, several people received high doses of radiation.
2003	O. Nuneangan, Chukotka	It was established that the external radiation of the device exceeded the permissible limits by 5 times due to flaws in its design.
2003	O. Wrangel, Chukotka	Due to erosion of the coast, the RTG installed here fell into the sea, where it was washed away by soil. In 2011, a storm washed up on the coast. The radiation protection of the device is not damaged. In 2012, it was removed from the territory of the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug.
2003	Cape Shalaurov Izba, Chukotka	The background radiation near the installation was 30 times higher due to a flaw in the RTG design.
2003, March	Pihlisaar, Leningrad region.	The RTG was looted by non-ferrous metal hunters. The radioactive element was released onto the ice surface. The hot capsule with strontium, having melted the ice, sank to the bottom; the background nearby was 1000 R/h. The capsule was soon found 200 m from the lighthouse.
2003, August	Shmidtovsky district, Chukotka	The inspection did not find RTG type "Beta-M" No. 57 at the installation site near the Kyvekvyn River; According to the official version, it was assumed that the RTG was washed into the sand as a result of a strong storm or that it was stolen.
2003, September	Golets Island, White Sea	Northern Fleet personnel discovered the theft of metal from an RTG biological shield on Golets Island. The door to the lighthouse room was also broken into, where one of the most powerful RTGs with six RIT-90 elements, which were not stolen, was stored.
2003, November	Kola Bay, Olenya Bay and South Goryachinsky Island	Two RTGs belonging to the Northern Fleet were looted by non-ferrous metal hunters, and their RIT-90 elements were found nearby.
2004	Priozersk, Kazakhstan	An emergency situation occurred as a result of the unauthorized dismantling of six RTGs.
2004, March	p. Valentin, Primorsky region	An RTG belonging to the Pacific Fleet was found dismantled, apparently by non-ferrous metal hunters. The radioactive element RIT-90 was discovered nearby.
July, 2004	Norilsk	Three RTGs were discovered on the territory of the military unit, the dose rate at a distance of 1 m from which was 155 times higher than the natural background.
July, 2004	Cape Navarin, Chukotka	Mechanical damage to the RTG body of unknown origin, as a result of which depressurization occurred and part of the radioactive fuel fell out. The emergency RTG was removed for disposal in 2007, the affected areas of the adjacent territory were decontaminated.
September, 2004	Land Bunge, Yakutia	Emergency release of two transported RTGs from a helicopter. As a result of the impact with the ground, the integrity of the radiation protection of the hulls was compromised; the gamma radiation dose rate near the impact site was 4 mSv/h.
2012	O. Lishny, Taimyr	At the installation site of the RTG of the Gong project, its fragments were discovered. It is assumed that the device was washed out to sea.

Notes

Konstantin Lantratov. Pluto has become closer (Russian) // Kommersant newspaper: article. - Kommersant, 2006. - Issue. 3341. - No. 10.
Alexander Sergeev. Probe to Pluto: an impeccable start to a great journey (Russian). - Elements.Ru, 2006.
Timoshenko, Alexey Space age —man turned out not needed (Russian) (inaccessible link - story) . gzt.ru (September 16, 2010). Retrieved October 22, 2010. Archived April 19, 2010.
Energy of pure science: Current from the collider (Russian) // physics arXiv blog Popular mechanics: article. - 08/12/10.
NASA conducted the first test drive of the new Mars rover (Russian). Lenta.ru (July 26, 2010). Retrieved November 8, 2010. Archived February 3, 2012.
Ajay K. Misra. Overview of NASA Program on Development of Radioisotope Power Systems with High Specific Power // NASA/JPL: review. - San Diego, California, June 2006.
World Information Service on Energy. Alaska fire threatens air force nukes.
Drits M. E. et al. Properties of elements. - Directory. - M.: Metallurgy, 1985. - 672 p. - 6500 copies.
Venkateswara Sarma Mallela, V Ilankumaran, N.Srinivasa Rao. Trends in Cardiac Pacemaker Batteries // Indian Pacing Electrophysiol J: article. - October 1, 2004. - Iss. 4 . - No. 4 .
Plutonium Powered Pacemaker (1974) (English) . Oak Ridge Associated Universities (March 23, 2009). Retrieved January 15, 2011.

Radioisotope thermoelectric generators

RTG (radioisotope thermoelectric generator) - a source of electricity using thermal energy radioactive decay. Strontium -90 is used as fuel for RTGs, and plutonium -238 is used for high-energy generators.

Abandoned Soviet RTGs

What is RTG

RTGs are sources of autonomous power supply with a constant voltage from 7 to 30 V for various autonomous equipment with a power from several watts to 80 W. Various electrical devices are used in conjunction with RTGs to ensure the accumulation and conversion of electrical energy generated by the generator. The most common uses of RTGs are as power sources for navigation signs, beacons and light signs. RTGs are also used as power sources for radio beacons and weather stations.

RTGs pose a potential danger because they are placed in deserted areas and can be stolen by terrorists and then used as a dirty bomb. The danger is quite real, since cases of dismantling RTGs by hunters for non-ferrous metals have already been recorded.

Radioactive element

RTGs use heat sources based on the radionuclide strontium-90 (SRT-90). The RIT-90 is a closed radiation source in which the fuel composition, usually in the form of ceramic strontium-90 titanate (SrTiO3), is doubly sealed by argon arc welding in a capsule. Some RTGs use strontium in the form of strontium borosilicate glass. The capsule is protected from external influences thick RTG shell made of of stainless steel, aluminum and lead. Biological protection is manufactured in such a way that the radiation dose on the surface of the devices does not exceed 200 mR/h, and at a distance of a meter - 10 mR/h

The radioactive half-life of strontium-90 (90Sr) is 29 years. At the time of manufacture, RIT-90 contains from 30 to 180 kKi of 90Sr. The decay of strontium produces a daughter isotope, the beta emitter, yttrium-90, with a half-life of 64 hours. The gamma radiation dose rate of RIT-90 by itself, without metal protection, reaches 400-800 R/h at a distance of 0.5 m and 100-200 R/h at 1 m from RIT-90.

Radioactive element RIT-90

Safe activity of RIT-90 is achieved only after 900 - 1,000 years. According to Gosatomnadzor (currently the Federal Nuclear Supervision Service), “the existing system for handling RTGs does not allow for the physical protection of these devices, and the situation with them can well be classified as an incident involving unattended storage of dangerous sources. Therefore, generators require immediate evacuation.”

According to the website of the RTG developer, the All-Russian Research Institute of Technical Physics and Automation (VNIITFA), plutonium-238 is used as fuel for high-energy radionuclide power plants. However, the use of heat sources based on plutonium-238 in RTGs, along with some technical advantages, requires significant financial costs, therefore, over the past 10-15 years, VNIITFA has not supplied such RTGs to domestic consumers for ground purposes.

The United States also used RTGs, mostly for space applications, but at least 10 RTGs were installed at remote military sites in Alaska in the 1970s. However, after one of the RTGs was endangered by a wildfire in 1992, the US Air Force began replacing them with diesel generators. According to the IAEA classification, RTGs belong to hazard class 1 (strongest sources, strongest emitters).

Security issues

According to RTG developers, even if RIT-90 gets into the environment during an accident or unauthorized removal from the RTG, the integrity of the source can be violated only as a result of its intentional, forced destruction.

“Perhaps it would be better to bury them so that no one finds them. But they were installed 30 years ago, when the threat of terrorism was not thought about; in addition, the RTGs were not vandal-proof,” says Alexander Agapov, head of the Department of Security and Emergency Situations of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy.

Minatom admits that “there are RTGs in a state of abandonment.” According to Agapov, “the fact is that the organizations that are responsible for operating RTGs do not want to pay for their decommissioning. This is the same problem as with the states formed on the territory of the former USSR - “take away all the bad, we will keep all the good for ourselves.”

At the same time, according to VNIITFA General Director Nikolai Kuzelev, “there is no problem of radioactive contamination of the environment surrounding the RTG.” At the same time, N. Kuzelev admits that “most places where RTGs are used do not meet the requirements of the current regulatory documents, which is known to the management of operating organizations.” “In reality, there is a problem of the RTG’s vulnerability to terrorist attacks that involve the targeted use of radioactive material contained in the RTG.”

Yield of strontium-90

According to specialists from the Hydrographic Enterprise of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation, “only sources of ionizing radiation based on strontium-90 RIT-90 pose a fundamental radiation hazard.” As long as the RTG body (which is the RIT-90 transport package) is intact, it is not considered radioactive waste. “If RIT-90 finds itself outside the radiation protection, it will pose a serious local danger to persons in close proximity to it. Radiation pollution environment excluded". This has not happened until now. An experimental explosion of a powerful anti-ship explosive device docked to the RTG destroyed the small RTG (57IK), but the RIT-90 included in it was undamaged.

As representatives of VNIITFA stated in 2003, “until now there has not been a single case of a violation of the tightness of the RIT-90 capsule, although there have been a number of serious emergency situations with RTGs.” At the same time, when commenting on incidents with RTGs, official representatives of Gosatomnadzor and the IAEA have repeatedly admitted the possibility of natural destruction of the RTG capsule. However, a survey in July 2004 recorded the release of Sr-90 into the environment from an IEU-1 type RTG located on Cape Navarin, Beringovsky district, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug. As noted in a statement by the Federal Nuclear Supervision Service (FSAN), this “indicates the beginning of the destruction of the radiation protection unit, thermal protection unit, protective housing and cartridge nests.”

There are about 1,000 RTGs on the territory of Russia (according to the head of the Department of Security and Emergency Situations of the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation, Alexander Agapov, as of September 2003 - 998 pieces), in the territory of other countries - about 30 pieces. According to Rosatom data for March 2005, “approximately 720 RTGs are in operation,” and about 200 have been decommissioned and disposed of with international assistance.

Presumably, about 1,500 RTGs were created in the USSR. The service life of all types of RTGs is 10 years. Currently, all RTGs in operation have reached the end of their service life and must be disposed of.

Owners and licensing

The owners of RTGs are the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation, and Roshydromet. The Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation has about 380 RTGs, their records are maintained by the Hydrographic State Enterprise. There are 535 of them in the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, including 415 in the Main Directorate of Navigation and Oceanology.

Gosatomnadzor monitors RTGs owned by the Ministry of Transport. Also, in accordance with Government Resolution 1007 and Directive D-3 of the Ministry of Defense dated January 20, 2003, Gosatomnadzor licenses and controls RTGs of the Ministry of Defense as nuclear installations that are not related to nuclear weapons.

However, in general, oversight of radiation and nuclear safety in military units has been entrusted to the Ministry of Defense since 1995. It turns out that the controller government agency- Gosatomnadzor of the Russian Federation often really does not have access to these RTGs. According to representatives of the State Hydrographic Enterprise of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation, to ensure the safe operation of RTGs along the Northern Sea Route, including taking into account the likelihood of “vandalism” and “terrorism”, it is sufficient to organize periodic (from several to once a year) monitoring of their physical condition and state of the radiation situation on the surface and near the RTGs.

However, Gosatomnadzor criticizes the approach of the Hydrographic Enterprise, including the extreme slowness of work to decommission RTGs with expired service life. The issues of storage, ensuring physical protection of RTGs and radiation safety of the population at their locations still remain problematic. Gosatomnadzor notes that in the current situation, the hydrographic services of the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Defense are actually violating Article 34 of the Law “On the Use of Atomic Energy,” according to which the operating organization must have the necessary material and other resources to operate nuclear energy facilities. In addition, according to Gosatomnadzor, in the structural divisions of the Hydrographic Enterprise “there are not enough trained specialists for timely inspection and maintenance of RTGs.”

RTG models

According to the State Hydrographic Enterprise of the Ministry of Transport of Russia, 381 RTGs of the Beta-M, Efir-MA, Horn and Gong types are in operation along the Northern Sea Route.

According to official reports of the State Committee for Ecology, “ existing system handling RTGs contradicts the provisions of the federal laws “On the Use of Atomic Energy” and “On Radiation Safety of the Population”, since the physical protection of these installations is not ensured. When placing RTGs, the possibility of damaging effects of natural and anthropogenic factors on them was not taken into account.

Due to shortcomings in the accounting and control practices of these installations by operating organizations, individual RTGs may be “lost” or “forgotten.” In fact, RTG sites can be considered as temporary storage sites for high-level waste.” “The possible negative consequences of losing control over RTGs under the jurisdiction of the State Hydrographic Enterprise and the Russian Ministry of Defense are of particular concern.” In the 60s - 80s of the last century, VNIITFA developed about ten types (standard sizes) of RTGs based on RIT-90 type sources.

RTGs are different various parameters by output electrical voltage, output electrical power, weight, dimensions, etc. The most widely used RTG is the “Beta-M” type, which was one of the first products developed in the late 60s of the last century. Currently, there are about 700 RTGs of this type in operation. This type of RTG, unfortunately, does not have welded joints and, as the practice of the last 10 years has shown, can be disassembled on site using ordinary metalwork tools. In the last 10 - 15 years, VNIITFA has not been working on the development of new RTGs.

Types and main characteristics of Soviet-made RTGs

Type	Thermal power of RIT, W	Initial nominal activity of RIT, thousand Curies	Electric power of RTG, W	RTG output voltage, V	RTG mass, kgm	Start of production
Ether-MA	720	111	30	35	1250	1976
IED-1	2200	49	80	24	2500	1976
IED-2	580	89	14	6	600	1977
Beta-M	230	35	10	-	560	1978
Gong	345	49	48	14	600	1983
Horn	1100	170	60	7 (14)	1050 (3 RIT)	1983
IEU-2M	690	106	20	14	600	1985
Senostav	1870	288	-	-	1250	1989
IEU-1M	2200 (3300)	340 (510)	120 (180)	28	2 (3) * 1050	1990

RTG accounting

The developer of the RTG design documentation was VNIITFA (All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics and Automation) in Moscow. The documentation was transferred to the manufacturer. The main customers of RTGs were the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Transport, the State Committee for Hydrometeorology (now Roshydromet) and the Ministry of Geology (the former Ministry of Geology, whose functions were transferred to the Ministry of Natural Resources).

During the development of RTGs, VNIITFA produced small quantities of prototypes. The serial manufacturing plant of RTGs in the USSR was the Baltiets plant in the city of Narva, Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic. This plant was repurposed in the early 1990s and is currently not related to RTGs. The Balti ES company (that is what this company is now called) confirmed to Bellona that they did not retain information about where the RTGs were supplied. However, the plant’s specialists participated in replacing RTGs with other energy sources at lighthouses in Estonia.

The commissioning of RTGs in the 1960s was carried out by a specialized organization of the USSR Ministry of Medium Engineering, which was liquidated long ago, or by the operating organizations themselves.

Where are the RTGs located?

About 80% of all manufactured RTGs were sent to hydrographic military units of the Ministry of Defense and civilian hydrographic bases along the Northern Sea Route.

According to VNIITFA, today the institute does not have complete information about the number of all manufactured RTGs and about all the organizations that own RTGs that are currently in operation. Taking into account the current situation in the country regarding the accounting of RTGs, VNIITFA has been collecting information on RTGs in operation in Russia and other countries of the former USSR for a number of years. To date, it has been established that there are about 1,000 RTGs in Russia. All of them have reached the end of their service life and are subject to disposal at specialized enterprises of the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation.

Under agreements with the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation, VNIITFA annually sends its specialists to conduct inspections of RTGs at the sites of their operation. In 2001-2002, 104 RTGs of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation were examined.

In the Gosatomnadzor report for 2003, the condition of RTGs in the Far Eastern District was recognized as unsatisfactory. In 2004, it was noted that the most “unsuccessful” organizations operating RTGs with serious violations of safety requirements remain the Tiksi and Providensky hydrographic bases and the Pevek pilot-hydrographic detachment of the State Hydrographic Enterprise of the Federal Agency for Maritime and River Transport. It was noted that “the state of physical protection of the RTG is at an extremely low level. Inspection of RTGs by specialists of the structural divisions of the above-mentioned enterprise is carried out rarely and is mainly located near the locations of these divisions; a number of RTGs have not been examined for more than 10 years (the Pevek LGO detachment and the Providensky hydrographic base lack trained specialists).”

According to various sources, about 40 lighthouses with RTGs are located along the coasts of Sakhalin, 30 - near the Kuril Islands. In Chukotka, according to official data, 150 RTGs have accumulated, many of which are ownerless. For example, RTGs belonging to Kolymhydromet were abandoned on the shores of Shelting Bay and on Cape Evreinov due to the collapse of the observation service. Of these, 58 are “Beta-M” type, 13 are “Ether”, 8 are “Gorn” and 6 are “Gong”. Some RTGs turn out to be simply lost: for example, in September 2003, an inspection did not find the Beta-M type RTG No. 57 at the Kuvekvyn point; assumptions were officially made about the possible washout of the RTG in the sand as a result of a strong storm or its theft by unknown persons.

It is possible that there are lost generators in the Arctic region. According to official data, at least six of them were in disrepair at the end of the 1990s. According to the conclusion of an official commission with the participation of Gosatomnadzor specialists, “the state of RTG safety is extremely unsatisfactory and represents real danger for flora, fauna and waters of the Arctic seas. Their improper placement could expose part of the indigenous population of the Arctic to unnecessary radiation.”

There are about 75 RTGs in the Republic of Sakha-Yakutia. In 2002, the federal target program “National Action Plan for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Anthropogenic Pollution in the Arctic Region” was approved Russian Federation" One of the items in the action plan to protect the marine environment was the inventory of RTGs. In Yakutia, it was decided to carry out a full inventory in 2002-2003. According to the head of the radiation safety department of the Ministry of Nature Protection of Yakutia, Tamara Argunova, due to the fact that the route of sea vessels is controlled by space satellites, the need to use RTGs has disappeared, and their prompt disposal should be carried out.

Generators located on the islands of the Laptev Sea, East Siberian Sea and the Arctic coast of the territories of the Anabar, Bulunsky, Ust-Yansky, Nizhnekolymsky uluses belong to the area of responsibility of the Khatanga, Tiksinsky, Kolyma hydrobases and the Pevek pilot detachment only on paper. Radiation safety requirements for the operation of RTGs along the Northern Sea Route remain violated. After 25 such installations, control has been lost. There are more than 100 RTGs in the Siberian Federal District, mainly in Taimyr.

There are about 153 RTGs on the coast of the Barents and White Seas, including 17 in the Kandalaksha Bay area. According to VNIITFA Director Nikolai Kuzelev, “100% of RTGs on the Baltic Sea coast are subject to annual inspections. At the same time, it should be recognized that RTGs were not examined by specialists from the Federal State Unitary Enterprise VNIITFA on the Arctic coast of the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug due to the lack of contracts.”

Emergency RTG in Chukotka Autonomous Okrug: release of 90Sr into the environment

According to the Far Eastern Interregional Territorial District of Gosatomnadzor of Russia, on August 16, 2003, during a commission inspection of RTGs located on the Arctic coast of the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, an emergency RTG of the IEU-1 type was discovered at Cape Navarin, Beringovsky District. The exposure dose rate on the surface of the generator was up to 15 R/h.

As the commission found, the generator “self-destructed as a result of some internal influence, not yet precisely determined by nature.” Radioactive contamination of the RTG body and the soil around it was detected. This was reported in letter No. 04-05\1603, sent to the leadership of the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation on August 20, 2003, by the General Director of VNIITFA Minatom N.R. Kuzelev and the responsible official of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation A.N. Kunakov.

In July 2004, a re-examination of the emergency RTG at Cape Navarin was carried out. As a result of the examination, it was established: the radiation situation has sharply worsened, the level of gamma radiation EDR reaches 87 R/h; Sr-90 began to leak into the external environment, which indicates the beginning of the destruction of the radiation protection unit, thermal protection unit, protective housing and cartridge nests (previously, VNIITFA experts repeatedly stated that it was impossible for strontium to escape into the environment).

Presumably, this RTG was shot down by an all-terrain vehicle by reindeer herders from a brigade stationed at Navarino in 1999. The generator heated up to 800 °C inside. The metal plates blocking the path of radiation burst. While the situation is saved concrete slab weighing 6 tons, which was used to close the generator last year. However, the radiation is thousands of times higher acceptable standards. On the southernmost cape of Chukotka, Navarin, reindeer herders graze their herds. Animals, and even people, are not stopped by warning signs - they come close to the source of radiation.

As mentioned in the FSAN report for 2004, “the technical condition of the RTG and the dynamics of the development of thermophysical processes in the RTG do not exclude it complete destruction“, and thermophysical processes (“expansion” by internal pressure) remain “unknown”. To date, the Russian Ministry of Defense is deciding the issue of its removal and disposal in July 2005.

Emergency and abandoned RTGs

Abandoned RTGs in the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug

Shalaur Island	Exceeding the permissible dose limit by 30 times. The RTG is in an ownerless, abandoned state.
Cape Okhotnichiy	Has severe external damage. Installed without taking into account the influence of hazardous natural phenomena in close proximity to the thermokarst depression. Maintenance personnel hid a transport accident that occurred with an RTG in March 1983.
Cape Heart-Stone	Installed 3 meters from the edge of a cliff up to 100 meters high. A cleavage crack passes through the site, and therefore the RTG may fall along with a large mass of rock. The installation of the RTG was carried out without taking into account the influence of hazardous natural phenomena (sea abrasion). It is stored there illegally.
Nuneangan Island	The external radiation from the RTG exceeds the established limits by 5 times. The reason is a design flaw. Transportation is possible only by special flight.
Cape Chaplin	Exceeding the permissible dose limit in the lower part of the body by 25 times. The technological plug has been removed from the lower part of the housing. The RTG is located on the territory of a military unit. The cause of the accident was a design flaw in this type of generator and the personnel concealment of a radiation accident with this RTG.
Chekkul Island	Exceeding the established dose limits by 35% at a distance of 1 m from the RTG surface.
Cape Shalaurov Izba	Exceeding the established dose limits by 80% at a distance of 1 m from the RTG surface.

It is recognized that another 15 RTGs of the Tiksi hydrobase are subject to removal due to the lack of need for use.

RTG incidents

Several incidents are detailed below; You can read about the latest incidents that took place at the end of 2003-2004 in the table at the end of this subsection.

On November 12, 2003, the Hydrographic Service of the Northern Fleet, during a routine inspection of navigation aids, discovered a completely disassembled RTG of the Beta-M type in the Olenya Bay of the Kola Bay (on the northern shore opposite the entrance to the Ekaterininskaya Harbor), near the city of Polyarny. The RTG was completely destroyed, and all its parts, including the depleted uranium protection, were stolen by unknown thieves. A radioisotope heat source - a capsule with strontium - was discovered in water off the coast at a depth of 1.5 - 3 meters.

On November 13, 2003, the same inspection, also in the area of the city of Polyarny, discovered a completely disassembled RTG of the same type “Beta-M”, which provides power to navigation sign No. 437 on the island of Yuzhny Goryachinsky in the Kola Bay (opposite the former village of Goryachiye Ruchi). Like the previous one, the RTG was completely destroyed, and all its parts, including the depleted uranium protection, were stolen. RIT was found on land near the coastline in the northern part of the island.

The administration of the Murmansk region qualifies the incident as a radiation accident. According to the administration, “RIT is a source of increased radiation hazard with a surface radiation power of about 1,000 roentgens per hour. The presence of people and animals near the source (closer than 500 meters) poses a danger to health and life. It must be assumed that the people who dismantled the RTGs received lethal doses of radiation. Currently, the FSB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs are searching for the thieves and RTG parts at scrap metal collection points.”

The exact date when the RTGs were looted has not been established. Apparently, the previous inspection of these RTGs was carried out no later than the spring of 2003. As Bellona learned, the area where the RTGs were located and where the strontium capsules were scattered is not closed and access there was not limited. Thus, it was possible for people to be exposed to radiation for a long time.

On March 12, 2003 (the same day that Minister of Atomic Energy Alexander Rumyantsev shared his concerns about the safety of nuclear materials at a conference in Vienna), the military of the Leningrad naval base discovered that one of the lighthouses on the shores of the Baltic Sea (Cape Pihlisaar Kurgalsky peninsula in the Leningrad region).

Before the loss was discovered, the last scheduled check of this beacon with a Beta-M type generator was carried out in June 2002. Non-ferrous metal hunters took away about 500 kg of stainless steel, aluminum and lead, and dumped a radioactive element (RIT-90) into the sea 200 meters from the lighthouse. A hot capsule with strontium melted the ice and sank to the bottom of the Baltic Sea. At the same time, the exposure dose rate of gamma radiation on the surface of almost a meter thick ice above the source was more than 30 R/h.

Since the border guard services in charge of the lighthouse are not sufficiently equipped, on March 23 they turned to the Radon Lenspetskombinat (Sosnovy Bor) with a request to find and isolate the radioactive cylinder. LSK "Radon" does not have a license for this type activities (the plant specializes in the disposal of radioactive waste), and therefore specifically coordinated the removal of the strontium battery from under the ice with Gosatomnadzor. On March 28, the radioactive element was removed using an ordinary shovel and a fork with long handles and transported to the road several kilometers away on an ordinary sled, where it was loaded into a lead container. The shell containing the strontium was not damaged. After temporary storage at the Radon LSK, the cylinder was transported to VNIITFA.

A similar lighthouse in the Leningrad region was looted in 1999. Then a radioactive element was discovered at a bus stop in the city of Kingisepp, 50 km from the scene of the incident. At least three people who stole the source died. Specialists from LSK Radon were also involved in eliminating the incident at that time.

The lighthouse, looted in March 2003, was located near the village of Kurgolovo, Kingisep district, not far from the borders with Estonia and Finland, on the territory of a nature reserve and wetland of international importance. The reserve was created in 2000 by decree of the governor of the Leningrad region in order to protect rare species flora and fauna, protection of the shallow water zone of the bay where commercial fish species spawn, as well as the habitats of the gray seal and ringed seal. On the territory of the reserve there are nesting colonies and migratory stops for rare waterfowl. When the reserve was created, tourism development was planned. A system of “ecological” trails and routes was developed: the nature of the peninsula could attract tourists. However, after two incidents involving the loss of a radioactive source, it is doubtful that tourists will want to come to these places.

In May 2001, three radioisotope sources were stolen from the lighthouses of the Russian Ministry of Defense located on an island in the White Sea near the Kandalaksha Nature Reserve in the Murmansk region. This reserve is also one of the centers of eco-tourism. Two hunters for non-ferrous metals received strong doses of radiation, and the stolen RTGs were found and sent to VNIITFA in June 2001. From there they were transported to the Mayak plant in the Chelyabinsk region. The work was financed by the administration of the Norwegian province of Finnmark under an agreement with the administration of the Murmansk region on a program for recycling RTGs and installing solar panels on lighthouses.

In 1987, the MI-8 helicopter of the Far Eastern Civil Aviation Administration, at the request of military unit 13148 of the Russian Ministry of Defense, transported on a sling to the area of Cape Nizky on east coast Sakhalin (Okha region) RTG type IEU-1 weighing two and a half tons. As the pilots explained, the weather was windy and the helicopter was so loose that, in order to prevent a fall, they were forced to dump the cargo into the sea.

In August 1997, another RTG of the same type fell from a helicopter into the sea near Cape Maria in the north of Sakhalin Island (Smirnykhovsky district). The installation fell into the water at a distance of 200-400 meters from the shore and lies at a depth of 25 - 30 meters. The reason, according to the military, was the opening of the external suspension lock on the helicopter due to incorrect actions by the crew commander. Despite the guilt of civilian aviators who transported RTGs on the external sling of helicopters, all responsibility lies with the owner of the RTGs - the Pacific Fleet of the Russian Ministry of Defense. The military was required to develop measures to prevent emergency situations, as well as conduct special instructions for helicopter crews, but none of this was done.

The search operation that discovered one of the RTGs (sunk in 1997) in the Sea of Okhotsk took place only in 2004. It is planned that the RTG will be raised no earlier than the summer of 2005. An expedition to search for another RTG has not yet been carried out.

Currently, both RTGs are lying on seabed. So far, there is no increased content of strontium-90 in seawater samples in these places, but the marine environment is quite aggressive. It is a chemically active medium, and RTGs are under pressure of several atmospheres. And in the RTG housings there are technological connectors and channels through which sea water will definitely leak inside. Then the radionuclide strontium-90 will end up in the sea and along the food chain “bottom microorganisms, algae, fish” - into human food. Representatives of the Magadan Department of Radiation Safety Inspection speak in favor of the likelihood of such a scenario, representatives of local branches of Gosatomnadzor demand the raising of RTGs, while pointing out that the developers of RTGs from VNIITFA did not test them for exposure to a chemically aggressive marine environment. The possibility of radionuclides escaping from RTGs at Capes Nizkiy and Maria is officially confirmed by IAEA experts. In addition, the release of strontium-90 into the environment began to be assessed by experts as a probable scenario after the release of strontium from an emergency RTG at Cape Navarin in Chukotka was recorded in July 2004. According to calculations by the Norwegian Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NRPA), in a worst-case scenario, the release of radioactivity into seawater could be up to 500 MBq of Sr-90 daily; Despite this figure, NRPA believes that the risk of strontium entering the human body through the food chain is negligible.

VNIITF specialists also participated in the liquidation of an emergency situation caused by the unauthorized dismantling of six Beta-M type RTGs in Kazakhstan near the city of Priozersk.

In 1998, in the village of Vankarem in Chukotka, a two-year-old girl died of leukemia. Two more children were in the district hospital to confirm the same diagnosis. According to some reports, the cause of the radiation was an abandoned RTG that was lying near the village.

So far, the fact of irradiation of the head of the Plastun navigation support station at Cape Yakubovsky in the Primorsky Territory, Vladimir Svyatets, remains officially unconfirmed. In March 2000, a damaged RTG from the Olginsky section of the hydrographic service of the Pacific Fleet, which had an increased background radiation, was unloaded near the Svyatets house near the lighthouse. As a result of being near the damaged RTG, V. Svyatets developed chronic radiation sickness, but this diagnosis of civilian doctors is disputed by the leadership and doctors of the Pacific Fleet.

Incidents with RTGs in Russia and the CIS

1978	Pulkovo Airport, Leningrad	The case of transporting a spent RTG without a transport container.
1983, March	Cape Nutevgi, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug	On the way to the installation site, the RTG was involved in a transport accident and was severely damaged. The fact of the accident, hidden by the staff, was discovered by a commission with the participation of Gosatomnadzor specialists in 1997.
1987	Cape Nizkiy, Sakhalin region	During transportation, the helicopter dropped an IEU-1 type RTG weighing 2.5 tons into the sea. The RTG, which belonged to the Ministry of Defense, remains at the bottom of the Sea of Okhotsk.
1997	Tajikistan, Dushanbe	An increased gamma background was registered on the territory of Tajikhydromet. Three expired RTGs were stored in the coal warehouse of the enterprise in the center of Dushanbe (since there were problems with sending RTGs to VNIITFA) and were dismantled by unknown persons.
1997, August	Cape Maria, Sakhalin region	A repetition of the events of ten years ago: during transportation, the helicopter dropped an IEU-1 RTG into the sea. The RTG, which belonged to the Ministry of Defense, remains at the bottom of the Sea of Okhotsk at a depth of 25 - 30 meters. The RTG was found as a result of an expedition in the fall of 2004, its recovery is scheduled for the summer of 2005.
1998, July	Korsakov port, Sakhalin region	An disassembled RTG was found at a scrap metal collection point. The stolen RTG belonged to the Russian Ministry of Defense.
1999	Leningrad region	The RTG was looted by non-ferrous metal hunters. A radioactive element (background near - 1000 R/h) was found at a bus stop in Kingissepp. Taken to LSK "Radon".
2000	Cape Malaya Baranikha, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug	Access to the RTG located near the village is not limited. In 2000, it was found that the radiation background of the source was several times higher than natural. Due to lack of funds, it was not evacuated.
2001, May	Kandalaksha Bay, Murmansk region	3 radioisotope sources were stolen from lighthouses on the island. All three sources were discovered and sent to Moscow by VNIITFA specialists.
2002, February	Western Georgia	Residents of the village of Liya, Tsalendzhikha district, received high doses of radiation after finding RTGs in the forest. Soon after the incident, the IAEA commission working in Georgia established that only Soviet time 8 generators were delivered.
2003, March	Cape Pikhlisaar, near the village of Kurgolovo, Leningrad region	The RTG was looted by non-ferrous metal hunters. A radioactive element (background near - 1000 R/h) was found 200 m from the lighthouse, in the water of the Baltic Sea. Extracted by specialists from LSK Radon.
2003, August-September	Chaunsky district, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug	The inspection did not find an RTG type<Бета-М>No. 57 at point<Кувэквын>, assumptions were officially made about the possible washout of the RTG in the sand as a result of a strong storm or its theft by unknown persons.
2003, September	Golets Island, White Sea	Northern Fleet personnel discovered the theft of RTG biological protection metal on Golets Island. The door to the lighthouse was also broken into. This beacon contained one of the most powerful RTGs with six RIT-90 elements, which were not stolen. The radiation on the surface of the RTG was 100 R/h.
2003, November	Kola Bay, Olenya Bay and South Goryachinsky Island	Two RTGs belonging to the Northern Fleet were looted by non-ferrous metal hunters, and their RIT-90 elements were found nearby.
2004, March	Lazovsky district of Primorsky Krai, near the village of Valentin	An RTG belonging to the Pacific Fleet was found dismantled, apparently by non-ferrous metal hunters. RIT-90 was found nearby.
2004, July	Norilsk, Krasnoyarsk region	Three RTGs were discovered on the territory of military unit 40919. According to the unit commander, these RTGs remained from another military unit previously stationed at this location. According to the Krasnoyarsk inspection department of Gosatomnadzor, the dose rate at a distance of about 1 m from the RTG body is 155 times higher than the natural background. Instead of solving this problem within the Ministry of Defense, the military unit in which the RTGs were discovered sent a letter to LLC<Квант>to Krasnoyarsk, engaged in the installation and adjustment of radiation equipment, with a request to take the RTGs to their disposal.
July, 2004	Cape Navarin, Beringovsky district of Chukotka Autonomous Okrug	Repeated examination of the emergency RTG type IEU-1 revealed that strontium-90 began to escape from the RTG into the environment as a result<неизвестных теплофизических процессов>. This refutes the thesis about the invulnerability of capsules with strontium, which has long been supported by VNIITFA. Technical condition The RTG and the dynamics of the development of thermophysical processes in the RTG do not exclude its complete destruction. The level of gamma radiation reaches 87 R/h.
September, 2004	Bunge Land Island, New Siberian Islands, Yakutia	Transported two RTGs<Эфир-МА>No. 04, 05 issue of 1982, owned by the Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Hydrographic Enterprise” of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation, an MI-8 MT helicopter made an emergency cargo drop from a height of 50 meters onto the sandy surface of the tundra of Bunge Island. According to the FSAN, as a result of the impact on the ground, the integrity of the external radiation protection of the RTG housings was broken; at a height of 10 meters above the place where the RTGs fell, the gamma radiation dose rate was 4 mSv/h. The cause of the incident was a violation<Гидрографическим предприятием>conditions for transporting RTGs (they were transported without transport packaging containers, which are required by IAEA standards). The rise of RTGs is expected in the summer of 2005.

In addition to the listed cases, it is necessary to mention that in August 1998, the Hydrographic Enterprise established the fact of theft of batteries from two RTGs of the Beta-M type at Cape Otmely, Khatanga Bay, Taimyr Peninsula. In August 2002, an inspection of the Hydrographic Enterprise of the Ministry of Transport discovered the disappearance of two Gong-type RTGs at Cape Kondratiev Strait of Dmitry Laptev. According to the hypothesis of the scientific enterprise Rudgeofizika, RTGs are located in the ground at a depth of 3 - 5 meters, however, no actions have been taken to detect RTGs and remove them from the ground until now.

Threat of terrorism

A US Congressional program known as CTR (Cooperative Threat Reduction), or Nunn-Lugar, which has been in place since 1991, views RTGs as a threat to the proliferation of radioactive materials that could be used to create a dirty bomb.

The program's website notes that the Russian government does not have sufficient data on the location of all RTGs. The goal of the program is to find them and free them from hazardous material.

On March 12, 2003, at the IAEA conference “Safety of Radioactive Sources,” Minister of Atomic Energy Alexander Rumyantsev acknowledged the existence of a problem. Facts that complicate the situation, according to Rumyantsev, “include the intensification various kinds terrorist groups in the world, and the disintegration of the former Soviet space, which led to the loss of control over the sources, and sometimes simply to the loss of the sources themselves. An example of this is the cases of unauthorized opening of RTGs by local residents in Kazakhstan and Georgia in order to use the non-ferrous metals contained in them. And the dose received as a result of such actions for some of them turned out to be extremely high.”

Rumyantsev admitted that “after the collapse of the USSR, the once integral state system of control over the location and movement of radioactive and nuclear materials was recreated in individual independent states, which gave rise to an unprecedented surge of hitherto uncharacteristic crimes associated, in particular, with radioactive sources.”

According to the IAEA, “High-risk radioactive sources that are not under reliable and regulated control, including so-called orphan sources, pose serious security and safety problems. Therefore, under the auspices of the IAEA, an international initiative should be implemented to promote the location, recovery and security of such radioactive sources throughout the world.”

RTG Disposal Programs

Since the RTGs, which are used in the navigation equipment of the Hydrographic Service of the Northern Fleet, have exhausted their service life and pose a potential threat of radioactive contamination of the environment, the administration of the Norwegian province of Finnmark is funding work on their disposal and partial replacement with solar panels. Civilian RTGs are not included in this project. There are a number of agreements on this between the Finnmark administration and the government of the Murmansk region. When dismantled, RTGs of the Northern Fleet are transported to Murmansk for temporary storage at RTP Atomflot, then they are sent to VO Izotop in Moscow, from there to VNIITFA, where they are dismantled in a special chamber, after which RIT-90 is sent for disposal to PA Mayak. . At the first stage of the program, 5 RTGs were replaced with Western-made solar cells. In 1998, the RTG was the first to be replaced at the lighthouse on Bolshoi Ainov Island in the Kandalaksha Nature Reserve; this work cost $35,400. According to the 1998 agreement, it was planned to replace 4 more RTGs (two were replaced in 1999, one in 2000 and another in 2002 at the Lausch navigation mark on the Rybachy Peninsula). In 2001, 15 RTGs were disposed of (12 in the usual manner, as well as three RTGs dismantled by non-ferrous metal hunters in the Kandalaksha area). In June 2002, an agreement was signed on the disposal of 10 more RTGs, and another $200,000 was allocated for these purposes. In August 2002, Bellona, together with experts from the US Congress, inspected a Norwegian lighthouse on solar powered near the Russian border. Bellona announced the need to replace Russian radioactive beacons. On April 8, 2003, the governors of Finnmark and the Murmansk region signed two contracts: for the disposal of spent RTGs and for testing Russian solar panels. The new phase of RTG disposal, undertaken in 2004, costs about $600,000. As of September 2004, 45 RTGs were disposed of within the framework of the joint project, while it was planned to dispose of 60 RTGs by the end of 2004, 34 of them equipped with solar panels. As of September 2004, the Norwegian province of Finnmark had already invested about $3.5 million in the project, but how much the program will cost in the future depends largely on the efforts of other potential donor countries. Cost of the project to replace RTGs with solar panels is 36,000 dollars, but these panels - Russian production, they are cheaper than their Western counterparts. The cost of each panel is about 1 million rubles. The solar battery is designed in such a way that it will accumulate electricity during daylight hours and release it during dark hours. The Krasnodar Saturn plant, owned by Rosaviakosmos, is participating in the work. Batteries were tested at one of the Murmansk lighthouses and at the lighthouse in Finnmark.

In August 2004, the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority (NRPA) completed its independent report on the disposal of Russian RTGs.

At the next Russian-Norwegian meeting in February 2005, it was decided to finance the disposal of the remaining 110 lighthouses (about 150 RIT, since some RTGs have several RIT) in the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk regions by 2009, replacing them with solar cells. The cost of the program is estimated at approximately $3.5 million.

US efforts

After September 11, 2001, the United States recognized the danger of RTGs, which could be used by terrorists to create a “dirty bomb.” In September 2003, Minatom signed a terms of reference with the US Department of Energy (DOE) for the disposal of a number of RTGs. According to the agreement, up to 100 RTGs per year will be disposed of at Mayak. According to the existing procedure, during disposal the RTG body is disassembled in a special chamber at VNIITFA. The RIT-90 contained inside can be used for energy purposes or converted into radioactive waste and sent for disposal in a special container to the city of Chelyabinsk at the Mayak plant, where it undergoes vitrification. Meanwhile, from 2000 to 2003, VNIITFA disposed of only about 100 RTGs various types, taken out of service. In 2004, a total of 69 RTGs from the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation were removed from various municipal territories across Russia for recycling. In 2005, it is planned to dispose of about 50 more RTGs from the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation. Rosatom plans to dispose of all RTGs (both those of the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Defense) by 2012. The Department of Energy's budget for a program to monitor radiological dispersal devices, which can be created using material contained in RTGs, was $36 million in FY 2004, and the request for FY 2005 was $25 million. RTG Disposal The Ministry of Transport of Russia began only in August 2004, within the framework of the DOE program. However, after the start of the program, in November 2004, Deputy General Director of the Hydrographic Enterprise of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation Evgeniy Klyuev told Bellona that “there is no policy for the disposal of RTGs, only RTGs in the worst condition are disposed of.”

In negotiations with American and German partners, Minatom also envisages an option under which the contents of RTGs will be stored in regional Radon test sites. In particular, a plan is being discussed to create a long-term modern storage facility for RTGs in the Siberian region, presumably on the territory of one or several Radon plants, in order to exclude their transportation to Moscow and back through Siberia to the Mayak PA. Meanwhile, Radon plants are designed to handle only medium and low radioactivity waste, while RTGs are classified as high-level waste. In March 2005, Rosatom announced that the DOE promised to consider the issue of Russian assistance in the construction at the DalRAO enterprise (in the area of the nuclear submarine base in Vilyuchinsk in Kamchatka) of a facility for dismantling RTGs (to prevent their sending to Moscow; burial is supposed to be carried out at "Mayak") Meanwhile, with American assistance, DalRAO has already begun construction of an intermediate storage point for RTGs in the Far Eastern region. Estimated cost The removal of one RTG from its location and the disposal procedure amounts to 4 million rubles (about $120,000, which is approximately equal to the cost of a new RTG). According to VNIITFA, the cost of disposal for RTGs in the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug is 1 million rubles (about $30,000).

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What is RTG

Radioactive element

RTGs use heat sources based on the radionuclide strontium-90 (SRT-90). The RIT-90 is a closed radiation source in which the fuel composition, usually in the form of ceramic strontium-90 titanate (SrTiO3), is doubly sealed by argon arc welding in a capsule. Some RTGs use strontium in the form of strontium borosilicate glass. The capsule is protected from external influences by a thick RTG shell made of stainless steel, aluminum and lead. Biological protection is manufactured in such a way that the radiation dose on the surface of the devices does not exceed 200 mR/h, and at a distance of a meter - 10 mR/h

Radioactive element RIT-90

Security issues

At the same time, according to VNIITFA General Director Nikolai Kuzelev, “there is no problem of radioactive contamination of the environment surrounding the RTG.” At the same time, N. Kuzelev admits that “most places where RTGs are used do not comply with the requirements of current regulatory documents, which is known to the management of operating organizations.” “In reality, there is a problem of the RTG’s vulnerability to terrorist attacks that involve the targeted use of radioactive material contained in the RTG.”

Yield of strontium-90

According to specialists from the Hydrographic Enterprise of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation, “only sources of ionizing radiation based on strontium-90 RIT-90 pose a fundamental radiation hazard.” As long as the RTG body (which is the RIT-90 transport package) is intact, it is not considered radioactive waste. “If RIT-90 finds itself outside the radiation protection, it will pose a serious local danger to persons in close proximity to it. Radiation contamination of the environment is excluded.” This has not happened until now. An experimental explosion of a powerful anti-ship explosive device docked to the RTG destroyed the small RTG (57IK), but the RIT-90 included in it was undamaged.

Owners and licensing

However, in general, oversight of radiation and nuclear safety in military units has been entrusted to the Ministry of Defense since 1995. It turns out that the controlling state body - Gosatomnadzor of the Russian Federation - often really does not have access to these RTGs. According to representatives of the State Hydrographic Enterprise of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation, to ensure the safe operation of RTGs along the Northern Sea Route, including taking into account the likelihood of “vandalism” and “terrorism”, it is sufficient to organize periodic (from several to once a year) monitoring of their physical condition and state of the radiation situation on the surface and near the RTGs.

RTG models

According to the State Hydrographic Enterprise of the Ministry of Transport of Russia, 381 RTGs of the Beta-M, Efir-MA, Horn and Gong types are in operation along the Northern Sea Route.

According to official reports of the State Committee for Ecology, “the existing system for handling RTGs contradicts the provisions of the federal laws “On the Use of Atomic Energy” and “On Radiation Safety of the Population”, since the physical protection of these installations is not ensured. When placing RTGs, the possibility of damaging effects of natural and anthropogenic factors on them was not taken into account.

RTGs differ in different parameters in terms of output electrical voltage, output electrical power, weight, dimensions, etc. The most widely used RTG is the “Beta-M” type, which was one of the first products developed in the late 60s of the last century. Currently, there are about 700 RTGs of this type in operation. This type of RTG, unfortunately, does not have welded joints and, as the practice of the last 10 years has shown, can be disassembled on site using ordinary metalwork tools. In the last 10 - 15 years, VNIITFA has not been working on the development of new RTGs.

Types and main characteristics of Soviet-made RTGs

Type	Thermal power of RIT, W	Initial nominal activity of RIT, thousand Curies	Electric power of RTG, W	RTG output voltage, V	RTG mass, kgm	Start of production
Ether-MA	720	111	30	35	1250	1976
IED-1	2200	49	80	24	2500	1976
IED-2	580	89	14	6	600	1977
Beta-M	230	35	10	-	560	1978
Gong	345	49	48	14	600	1983
Horn	1100	170	60	7 (14)	1050 (3 RIT)	1983
IEU-2M	690	106	20	14	600	1985
Senostav	1870	288	-	-	1250	1989
IEU-1M	2200 (3300)	340 (510)	120 (180)	28	2 (3) * 1050	1990

RTG accounting

Where are the RTGs located?

About 80% of all manufactured RTGs were sent to hydrographic military units of the Ministry of Defense and civilian hydrographic bases along the Northern Sea Route.

It is possible that there are lost generators in the Arctic region. According to official data, at least six of them were in disrepair at the end of the 1990s. According to the conclusion of an official commission with the participation of Gosatomnadzor specialists, “the state of RTG safety is extremely unsatisfactory and poses a real danger to the flora, fauna and waters of the Arctic seas. Their improper placement could expose part of the indigenous population of the Arctic to unnecessary radiation.”

There are about 75 RTGs in the Republic of Sakha-Yakutia. In 2002, the federal target program “National Action Plan for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Anthropogenic Pollution in the Arctic Region of the Russian Federation” was approved. One of the items in the action plan to protect the marine environment was the inventory of RTGs. In Yakutia, it was decided to carry out a full inventory in 2002-2003. According to the head of the radiation safety department of the Ministry of Nature Protection of Yakutia, Tamara Argunova, due to the fact that the route of sea vessels is controlled by space satellites, the need to use RTGs has disappeared, and their prompt disposal should be carried out.

Emergency RTG in Chukotka Autonomous Okrug: release of 90Sr into the environment

Presumably, this RTG was shot down by an all-terrain vehicle by reindeer herders from a brigade stationed at Navarino in 1999. The generator heated up to 800 °C inside. The metal plates blocking the path of radiation burst. For now, the situation is saved by a concrete slab weighing 6 tons, which was used to cover the generator last year. However, the radiation is thousands of times higher than permissible standards. On the southernmost cape of Chukotka, Navarin, reindeer herders graze their herds. Animals, and even people, are not stopped by warning signs - they come close to the source of radiation.

As mentioned in the FSAN report for 2004, “the technical condition of the RTG and the dynamics of the development of thermophysical processes in the RTG do not exclude its complete destruction,” and the thermophysical processes (“expansion” by internal pressure) remain “unknown.” To date, the Russian Ministry of Defense is deciding the issue of its removal and disposal in July 2005.

Emergency and abandoned RTGs

Abandoned RTGs in the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug

Shalaur Island	Exceeding the permissible dose limit by 30 times. The RTG is in an ownerless, abandoned state.
Cape Okhotnichiy	Has severe external damage. Installed without taking into account the influence of hazardous natural phenomena in the immediate vicinity of the thermokarst depression. Maintenance personnel hid a transport accident that occurred with an RTG in March 1983.
Cape Heart-Stone	Installed 3 meters from the edge of a cliff up to 100 meters high. A cleavage crack passes through the site, and therefore the RTG may fall along with a large mass of rock. The installation of the RTG was carried out without taking into account the influence of hazardous natural phenomena (sea abrasion). It is stored there illegally.
Nuneangan Island	The external radiation from the RTG exceeds the established limits by 5 times. The reason is a design flaw. Transportation is possible only by special flight.
Cape Chaplin	Exceeding the permissible dose limit in the lower part of the body by 25 times. The technological plug has been removed from the lower part of the housing. The RTG is located on the territory of a military unit. The cause of the accident was a design flaw in this type of generator and the personnel concealment of a radiation accident with this RTG.
Chekkul Island	Exceeding the established dose limits by 35% at a distance of 1 m from the RTG surface.
Cape Shalaurov Izba	Exceeding the established dose limits by 80% at a distance of 1 m from the RTG surface.

It is recognized that another 15 RTGs of the Tiksi hydrobase are subject to removal due to the lack of need for use.

RTG incidents

Several incidents are detailed below; You can read about the latest incidents that took place at the end of 2003-2004 in the table at the end of this subsection.

Since the border guard services in charge of the lighthouse are not sufficiently equipped, on March 23 they turned to the Radon Lenspetskombinat (Sosnovy Bor) with a request to find and isolate the radioactive cylinder. LSK Radon does not have a license for this type of activity (the plant specializes in the disposal of radioactive waste), and therefore specifically coordinated the removal of the strontium battery from under the ice with Gosatomnadzor. On March 28, the radioactive element was removed using an ordinary shovel and a fork with long handles and transported to the road several kilometers away on an ordinary sled, where it was loaded into a lead container. The shell containing the strontium was not damaged. After temporary storage at the Radon LSK, the cylinder was transported to VNIITFA.

The lighthouse, looted in March 2003, was located near the village of Kurgolovo, Kingisep district, not far from the borders with Estonia and Finland, on the territory of a nature reserve and wetland of international importance. The reserve was created in 2000 by a decree of the governor of the Leningrad region with the aim of protecting rare species of flora and fauna, protecting the shallow zone of the bay where commercial fish species spawn, as well as the habitats of the gray seal and ringed seal. On the territory of the reserve there are nesting colonies and migratory stops for rare waterfowl. When the reserve was created, tourism development was planned. A system of “ecological” trails and routes was developed: the nature of the peninsula could attract tourists. However, after two incidents involving the loss of a radioactive source, it is doubtful that tourists will want to come to these places.

In 1987, the MI-8 helicopter of the Far Eastern Civil Aviation Administration, at the request of military unit 13148 of the Russian Ministry of Defense, transported an IEU-1 type RTG weighing two and a half tons on a sling to the area of Cape Nizkiy on the eastern coast of Sakhalin (Okha region). As the pilots explained, the weather was windy and the helicopter was so loose that, in order to prevent a fall, they were forced to dump the cargo into the sea.

Currently, both RTGs lie on the seabed. So far, there is no increased content of strontium-90 in seawater samples in these places, but the marine environment is quite aggressive. It is a chemically active medium, and RTGs are under pressure of several atmospheres. And in the RTG housings there are technological connectors and channels through which sea water will definitely leak inside. Then the radionuclide strontium-90 will end up in the sea and along the food chain “bottom microorganisms, algae, fish” - into human food. Representatives of the Magadan Department of Radiation Safety Inspection speak in favor of the likelihood of such a scenario, representatives of local branches of Gosatomnadzor demand the raising of RTGs, while pointing out that the developers of RTGs from VNIITFA did not test them for exposure to a chemically aggressive marine environment. The possibility of radionuclides escaping from RTGs at Capes Nizkiy and Maria is officially confirmed by IAEA experts. In addition, the release of strontium-90 into the environment began to be assessed by experts as a probable scenario after the release of strontium from an emergency RTG at Cape Navarin in Chukotka was recorded in July 2004. According to calculations by the Norwegian Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NRPA), in a worst-case scenario, the release of radioactivity into seawater could be up to 500 MBq of Sr-90 daily; Despite this figure, NRPA believes that the risk of strontium entering the human body through the food chain is negligible.

VNIITF specialists also participated in the liquidation of an emergency situation caused by the unauthorized dismantling of six Beta-M type RTGs in Kazakhstan near the city of Priozersk.

Incidents with RTGs in Russia and the CIS

1978	Pulkovo Airport, Leningrad	The case of transporting a spent RTG without a transport container.
1983, March	Cape Nutevgi, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug	On the way to the installation site, the RTG was involved in a transport accident and was severely damaged. The fact of the accident, hidden by the staff, was discovered by a commission with the participation of Gosatomnadzor specialists in 1997.
1987	Cape Nizkiy, Sakhalin region	During transportation, the helicopter dropped an IEU-1 type RTG weighing 2.5 tons into the sea. The RTG, which belonged to the Ministry of Defense, remains at the bottom of the Sea of Okhotsk.
1997	Tajikistan, Dushanbe	An increased gamma background was registered on the territory of Tajikhydromet. Three expired RTGs were stored in the coal warehouse of the enterprise in the center of Dushanbe (since there were problems with sending RTGs to VNIITFA) and were dismantled by unknown persons.
1997, August	Cape Maria, Sakhalin region	A repetition of the events of ten years ago: during transportation, the helicopter dropped an IEU-1 RTG into the sea. The RTG, which belonged to the Ministry of Defense, remains at the bottom of the Sea of Okhotsk at a depth of 25 - 30 meters. The RTG was found as a result of an expedition in the fall of 2004, its recovery is scheduled for the summer of 2005.
1998, July	Korsakov port, Sakhalin region	An disassembled RTG was found at a scrap metal collection point. The stolen RTG belonged to the Russian Ministry of Defense.
1999	Leningrad region	The RTG was looted by non-ferrous metal hunters. A radioactive element (background near - 1000 R/h) was found at a bus stop in Kingissepp. Taken to LSK "Radon".
2000	Cape Malaya Baranikha, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug	Access to the RTG located near the village is not limited. In 2000, it was found that the radiation background of the source was several times higher than natural. Due to lack of funds, it was not evacuated.
2001, May	Kandalaksha Bay, Murmansk region	3 radioisotope sources were stolen from lighthouses on the island. All three sources were discovered and sent to Moscow by VNIITFA specialists.
2002, February	Western Georgia	Residents of the village of Liya, Tsalendzhikha district, received high doses of radiation after finding RTGs in the forest. Soon after the incident, the IAEA commission working in Georgia established that a total of 8 generators were brought to Georgia from the Baltiets plant in Soviet times.
2003, March	Cape Pikhlisaar, near the village of Kurgolovo, Leningrad region	The RTG was looted by non-ferrous metal hunters. A radioactive element (background near - 1000 R/h) was found 200 m from the lighthouse, in the water of the Baltic Sea. Extracted by specialists from LSK Radon.
2003, August-September	Chaunsky district, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug	The inspection did not find an RTG type<Бета-М>No. 57 at point<Кувэквын>, assumptions were officially made about the possible washout of the RTG in the sand as a result of a strong storm or its theft by unknown persons.
2003, September	Golets Island, White Sea	Northern Fleet personnel discovered the theft of RTG biological protection metal on Golets Island. The door to the lighthouse was also broken into. This beacon contained one of the most powerful RTGs with six RIT-90 elements, which were not stolen. The radiation on the surface of the RTG was 100 R/h.
2003, November	Kola Bay, Olenya Bay and South Goryachinsky Island	Two RTGs belonging to the Northern Fleet were looted by non-ferrous metal hunters, and their RIT-90 elements were found nearby.
2004, March	Lazovsky district of Primorsky Krai, near the village of Valentin	An RTG belonging to the Pacific Fleet was found dismantled, apparently by non-ferrous metal hunters. RIT-90 was found nearby.
2004, July	Norilsk, Krasnoyarsk region	Three RTGs were discovered on the territory of military unit 40919. According to the unit commander, these RTGs remained from another military unit previously stationed at this location. According to the Krasnoyarsk inspection department of Gosatomnadzor, the dose rate at a distance of about 1 m from the RTG body is 155 times higher than the natural background. Instead of solving this problem within the Ministry of Defense, the military unit in which the RTGs were discovered sent a letter to LLC<Квант>to Krasnoyarsk, engaged in the installation and adjustment of radiation equipment, with a request to take the RTGs to their disposal.
July, 2004	Cape Navarin, Beringovsky district of Chukotka Autonomous Okrug	Repeated examination of the emergency RTG type IEU-1 revealed that strontium-90 began to escape from the RTG into the environment as a result<неизвестных теплофизических процессов>. This refutes the thesis about the invulnerability of capsules with strontium, which has long been supported by VNIITFA. The technical condition of the RTG and the dynamics of the development of thermophysical processes in the RTG do not exclude its complete destruction. The level of gamma radiation reaches 87 R/h.
September, 2004	Bunge Land Island, New Siberian Islands, Yakutia	Transported two RTGs<Эфир-МА>No. 04, 05 issue of 1982, owned by the Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Hydrographic Enterprise” of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation, an MI-8 MT helicopter made an emergency cargo drop from a height of 50 meters onto the sandy surface of the tundra of Bunge Island. According to the FSAN, as a result of the impact on the ground, the integrity of the external radiation protection of the RTG housings was broken; at a height of 10 meters above the place where the RTGs fell, the gamma radiation dose rate was 4 mSv/h. The cause of the incident was a violation<Гидрографическим предприятием>conditions for transporting RTGs (they were transported without transport packaging containers, which are required by IAEA standards). The rise of RTGs is expected in the summer of 2005.

Threat of terrorism

The program's website notes that the Russian government does not have sufficient data on the location of all RTGs. The goal of the program is to find them and free them from hazardous material.

On March 12, 2003, at the IAEA conference “Safety of Radioactive Sources,” Minister of Atomic Energy Alexander Rumyantsev acknowledged the existence of a problem. Facts that complicate the situation, according to Rumyantsev, “include the activation of various kinds of terrorist groups in the world, and the disintegration of the former Soviet space, which led to the loss of control over sources, and sometimes simply to the loss of the sources themselves. An example of this is the cases of unauthorized opening of RTGs by local residents in Kazakhstan and Georgia in order to use the non-ferrous metals contained in them. And the dose received as a result of such actions for some of them turned out to be extremely high.”

RTG Disposal Programs

Since the RTGs, which are used in the navigation equipment of the Hydrographic Service of the Northern Fleet, have exhausted their service life and pose a potential threat of radioactive contamination of the environment, the administration of the Norwegian province of Finnmark is funding work on their disposal and partial replacement with solar panels. Civilian RTGs are not included in this project. There are a number of agreements on this between the Finnmark administration and the government of the Murmansk region. When dismantled, RTGs of the Northern Fleet are transported to Murmansk for temporary storage at RTP Atomflot, then they are sent to VO Izotop in Moscow, from there to VNIITFA, where they are dismantled in a special chamber, after which RIT-90 is sent for disposal to PA Mayak. . At the first stage of the program, 5 RTGs were replaced with Western-made solar cells. In 1998, the RTG was the first to be replaced at the lighthouse on Bolshoi Ainov Island in the Kandalaksha Nature Reserve; this work cost $35,400. According to the 1998 agreement, it was planned to replace 4 more RTGs (two were replaced in 1999, one in 2000 and another in 2002 at the Lausch navigation mark on the Rybachy Peninsula). In 2001, 15 RTGs were disposed of (12 in the usual manner, as well as three RTGs dismantled by non-ferrous metal hunters in the Kandalaksha area). In June 2002, an agreement was signed on the disposal of 10 more RTGs, and another $200,000 was allocated for these purposes. In August 2002, Bellona, together with experts from the US Congress, inspected a Norwegian solar-powered lighthouse near the Russian border. Bellona announced the need to replace Russian radioactive beacons. On April 8, 2003, the governors of Finnmark and the Murmansk region signed two contracts: for the disposal of spent RTGs and for testing Russian solar panels. The new phase of RTG disposal, undertaken in 2004, costs about $600,000. As of September 2004, 45 RTGs were disposed of within the framework of the joint project, while it was planned to dispose of 60 RTGs by the end of 2004, 34 of them equipped with solar panels. As of September 2004, the Norwegian province of Finnmark had already invested about $3.5 million in the project, but how much the program will cost in the future depends largely on the efforts of other potential donor countries. The cost of the project to replace RTGs with solar panels is $36,000, but these panels are made in Russia and are cheaper than their Western counterparts. The cost of each panel is about 1 million rubles. The solar battery is designed in such a way that it will accumulate electricity during daylight hours and release it during dark hours. The Krasnodar Saturn plant, owned by Rosaviakosmos, is participating in the work. Batteries were tested at one of the Murmansk lighthouses and at the lighthouse in Finnmark.

In August 2004, the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority (NRPA) completed its independent report on the disposal of Russian RTGs.

US efforts

After September 11, 2001, the United States recognized the danger of RTGs, which could be used by terrorists to create a “dirty bomb.” In September 2003, Minatom signed a terms of reference with the US Department of Energy (DOE) for the disposal of a number of RTGs. According to the agreement, up to 100 RTGs per year will be disposed of at Mayak. According to the existing procedure, during disposal the RTG body is disassembled in a special chamber at VNIITFA. The RIT-90 contained inside can be used for energy purposes or converted into radioactive waste and sent for disposal in a special container to the city of Chelyabinsk at the Mayak plant, where it undergoes vitrification. Meanwhile, from 2000 to 2003, VNIITFA disposed of only about 100 RTGs of various types that were decommissioned. In 2004, a total of 69 RTGs from the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation were removed from various municipal territories across Russia for recycling. In 2005, it is planned to dispose of about 50 more RTGs from the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation. Rosatom plans to dispose of all RTGs (both those of the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Defense) by 2012. The Department of Energy's budget for a program to monitor radiological dispersal devices, which can be created using material contained in RTGs, was $36 million in FY 2004, and the request for FY 2005 was $25 million. RTG Disposal The Ministry of Transport of Russia began only in August 2004, within the framework of the DOE program. However, after the start of the program, in November 2004, Deputy General Director of the Hydrographic Enterprise of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation Evgeniy Klyuev told Bellona that “there is no policy for the disposal of RTGs, only RTGs in the worst condition are disposed of.”

In negotiations with American and German partners, Minatom also envisages an option under which the contents of RTGs will be stored in regional Radon test sites. In particular, a plan is being discussed to create a long-term modern storage facility for RTGs in the Siberian region, presumably on the territory of one or several Radon plants, in order to exclude their transportation to Moscow and back through Siberia to the Mayak PA. Meanwhile, Radon plants are designed to handle only medium and low radioactivity waste, while RTGs are classified as high-level waste. In March 2005, Rosatom announced that the DOE promised to consider the issue of Russian assistance in the construction at the DalRAO enterprise (in the area of the nuclear submarine base in Vilyuchinsk in Kamchatka) of a facility for dismantling RTGs (to prevent their sending to Moscow; burial is supposed to be carried out at "Mayak") Meanwhile, with American assistance, DalRAO has already begun construction of an intermediate storage point for RTGs in the Far Eastern region. The estimated cost of removing one RTG from its location and disposal procedure is 4 million rubles (about $120,000, which is approximately equal to the cost of a new RTG). According to VNIITFA, the cost of disposal for RTGs in the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug is 1 million rubles (about $30,000).

- RTG (radioisotope thermoelectric generator) is a source of electricity that uses the thermal energy of radioactive decay. Strontium 90 is used as fuel for RTGs, and plutonium 238 is used for high-energy generators.... ... Wikipedia

Thermoelectric phenomena ... Wikipedia

One of the radioisotope generators of the Cassini probe ... Wikipedia

Radioisotope energy sources are devices that use the energy released during radioactive decay to heat a coolant or convert it into electricity.

Radioisotope thermoelectric generators
(radioisotope thermoelectric generator (RTG, RITEG)

A radioisotope thermoelectric generator (RTG) converts thermal energy released during the natural decay of radioactive isotopes into electricity.
RTGs consist of two main elements: a heat source that contains a radioactive isotope, and solid-state thermocouples that convert the thermal energy of plutonium decay into electricity. The thermocouples in an RTG use heat from the decay of a radioactive isotope to heat the hot side of the thermocouple and the cold of space or the planetary atmosphere to produce a low temperature on the cold side.
Compared to nuclear reactors, RTGs are much more compact and simpler in design. The output power of RTGs is very low (up to several hundred watts) and the efficiency is low. But they have no moving parts and do not require maintenance throughout their entire service life, which can be decades.
In an improved type of RTG - The Multi-Mission Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (MMRTG), which has come into use recently, the composition of the thermocouple has been changed. Instead of SiGe, MMRTG uses PbTe/TAGS (Te, Ag, Ge, Sb) for thermocouples.
The MMRTG is designed to produce 125 W of electricity at the start of the mission, falling to 100 W after 14 years. With a mass of 45 kg, MMRTG provides about 2.8 W/kg of electricity at the beginning of life. The MMRTG design is capable of operating both in the vacuum of outer space and in planetary atmospheres, for example, on the surface of Mars. The MMRTG provides a high degree of safety, minimized weight and optimized power levels over a minimum service life of 14 years.
NASA is also working on new technology RTG, called Advanced Stirling Radioisotope Generator ASRG (Stirling Radioisotope Generator). ASRG, like MMRTG, converts the decay heat of plutonium-238 into electricity, but does not use thermocouples. Instead, the heat of decay causes the gas to expand and oscillate the piston, much like a car engine. This moves the magnet back and forth through the coil more than 100 times per second, generating electricity for the spacecraft. The amount of electricity produced is greater than the MMRTG by about 130 watts, with much less plutonium-238 (about 3.6 kg less). This is the result of a more efficient conversion of the Stirling cycle. If a mission requires more power, multiple ASRGs can be used to generate more power. There are currently no planned missions that will use ASRGs, but they are being developed for a 14-year mission.
There is a concept of subcritical RTGs. A subcritical generator consists of a neutron source and fissile material with as large a critical mass as possible. Neutrons from the source are captured by atoms of the fissile substance and cause their fission. A very important place when choosing a working isotope is played by the formation of a daughter isotope capable of significant heat release, since the nuclear transformation chain during decay lengthens and, accordingly, the total energy that can be used increases. The best example An isotope with a long decay chain and an energy release an order of magnitude greater than most other isotopes is uranium-232. The main advantage of such a generator is that the decay energy of a reaction with neutron capture can be much higher than the energy of spontaneous fission. Accordingly, the required amount of the substance is much lower. The number of decays and radiation activity in terms of heat release are also lower. This reduces the weight and size of the generator.

Unfortunately, the requirements for the characteristics of radioisotopes used in RTGs are often contradictory. In order to maintain power long enough to complete the task, the half-life of the radioisotope must be long enough. On the other hand, it must have a sufficiently high volumetric activity to obtain a significant energy release in a limited volume of the installation. This means that its half-life should not be too short, because the specific activity is inversely proportional to the decay period.
The radioisotope must have a type of ionizing radiation that is convenient for disposal. Gamma radiation and neutrons leave the structure quite easily, carrying away a significant part of the decay energy. Although high-energy electrons from β-decay are retained quite well, they produce bremsstrahlung X-rays, which carry away some of the energy. In addition, gamma, x-ray and neutron radiation often require special design measures to protect personnel (if present) and nearby equipment.
Alpha radiation is preferred for radioisotope energy generation.
Not the least important role in choosing a radioisotope is its relative cheapness and ease of production.
Typical half-lives for radioisotopes used in RTGs are several decades, although isotopes with shorter half-lives may be used for specialized applications.

Low-power and small-sized radioisotope power sources

Beta Voltaic Power Supplies
(Betavoltaic power sources)

There are also non-thermal generators that are similar in operating principle to solar panels. These are beta-galvanic and optical-electric sources. They are small-sized and designed to power devices that do not require high power.
In a beta voltaic power supply, an isotope source emits beta particles that collect on the semiconductor. As a result, direct current is generated. The energy conversion process, which is similar to that of a photovoltaic (solar) cell, occurs efficiently even under extreme environmental conditions. By selecting the amount and type of isotope, a customizable power source with a specified output and lifetime can be created. Such batteries practically do not produce gamma rays, and soft beta radiation is blocked by the battery housing and a layer of phosphorus. Beta voltaic sources have high energy density and ultra-low power. This allows the beta voltaic device to last longer than capacitors or batteries for low power devices. The duration of operation, for example, of a beta-voltaic source based on promethium oxide is approximately two and a half years, and 5 mg of promethium oxide gives an energy of 8 W. The service life of beta-voltaic sources can exceed 25 years.

Beta voltaic effect. The operation of a beta-voltaic converter is based on the fact that high-energy electrons or positrons emitted during decay, entering the region
p-n transition of the semiconductor wafer, generate an electron-hole pair there, which is then spatially separated by a space charge region (SCR). As a result of this, on n And p- On the surfaces of the semiconductor wafer, an electrical potential difference arises. In principle, the conversion mechanism resembles that implemented in semiconductor solar cells, but with the replacement of photon irradiation by irradiation with electrons or positrons from the beta decay of radionuclides.

Piezoelectric radioisotope microelectric generator
(The Radioisotope Thin-film Mkropower Generator)

The heart of this battery is the cantilever, a thin plate of piezoelectric crystal. A collector at the tip of the cantilever captures charged particles emitted from a thin-film radioactive source. Due to charge conservation, the radioisotope film remains with equal and opposite charges. This results in electrostatic forces between the cantilever and the radioactive source, bending the cantilever and converting the energy emitted by the source into stored mechanical energy. The cantilever bends more and more and finally the tip of the cantilever comes into contact with the radioactive thin film, and the accumulated charges are neutralized through charge transfer. This happens periodically. When the electrostatic force is suppressed, the cantilever is released. The sudden release excites vibrations that result in charges being induced in the piezoelectric element at the base of the cantilever. The AC signal from the piezoelectric power supply can be used directly through the load impedance or rectified using diodes and filtered through an external capacitor. The bias voltage raised in this way is used to drive low-power sensors and electronics.

The main area of application of isotope sources is space research. The study of “deep space” without the use of radioisotope generators is impossible, since at a significant distance from the Sun the level of solar energy that could be used to produce electricity necessary for the operation of equipment and the transmission of radio signals is very small. Chemical sources also did not justify themselves.
On Earth, radioisotope sources have found use in navigation beacons, radio beacons, weather stations and similar equipment installed in areas where, for technical or economic reasons, it was not possible to use other power sources. In particular, several types of thermoelectric generators were produced in the USSR. They used 90 Sr and 238 Pu as radioactive isotopes. However, they have a very long period of achieving safe activity. They have reached the end of their 10-year service life and must now be disposed of. Currently, due to the risk of leakage of radiation and radioactive materials, the practice of installing unattended radioisotope sources in inaccessible places has been stopped.
Radioisotope energy sources are used where it is necessary to ensure autonomous operation of equipment, compactness, and reliability.

Radioisotopes and their uses

With the development and growth of nuclear energy, prices for the most important generator isotopes are rapidly falling, and the production of isotopes is rapidly increasing. At the same time, the cost of isotopes obtained by irradiation (U-232, Pu-238, Po-210, Cm-242, etc.) decreases slightly. In this connection, methods are being sought for more rational schemes for target irradiation and more thorough processing of irradiated fuel. Great hopes for expanding the production of synthetic isotopes are associated with the growth of the fast neutron reactor sector. In particular, it is fast neutron reactors using significant quantities of thorium that make it possible to hope for obtaining large industrial quantities of uranium-232.
By using isotopes, the problem of disposing of spent nuclear fuel is largely resolved, and radioactive waste is transformed from hazardous waste not only into an additional source of energy, but also into a source of significant income. Almost complete reprocessing of irradiated fuel can generate funds comparable to the cost of energy generated during the fission of uranium, plutonium and other elements.

Plutonium-238, curium-244 and strontium-90 are the most commonly used isotopes. In addition to these, about 30 more radioactive isotopes are used in technology and medicine.

Some mastered by practice radioisotope sources heat

Isotope	Receipt (source)	Power density for a pure isotope. W/g	T 1/2
60 Co	Irradiation in the reactor	2.9	5.271 years
238 Pu	atomic reactor	0.568	87.7 years
90 Sr	fission fragments	~2.3	28.8 years
144 Ce	fission fragments	2.6	285 days
242 cm	atomic reactor	121	162 days
147 PM	fission fragments	0.37	2.64 years
137 Cs	fission fragments	0.27	33 years
210Po	bismuth irradiation	142	138 days
244 cm	atomic reactor	2.8	18.1 years
232 U	irradiation of thorium	8.097	68.9 years
106 Ru	fission fragments	29.8	~371.63 days

238 Pu 238 Pu has a half-life of 87.7 years (power loss 0.78% per year), the specific power for the pure isotope is 0.568 W/g and exclusively low levels gamma and neutron radiation. 238 Pu has the lowest shielding requirements. Less than 25 mm of lead shielding is required to block 238 Pu radiation. 238 Pu has become the most widely used fuel for RTGs, in the form of plutonium oxide (PuO 2 ).
In the middle of the last century, 236 Pu and 238 Pu were used for the manufacture of radioisotopes electric batteries for powering pacemakers whose service life reached 5 years or more. However, soon non-radioactive lithium batteries began to be used instead, with a service life of up to 17 years.
238 Pu must be specially synthesized; it is small (~1% - 2%) in nuclear waste, its isotopic isolation is difficult. Pure 238 Pu can be obtained, for example, by irradiating 237 Np with neutrons.
Curium. Two isotopes 242 Cm and 244 Cm are alpha emitters (energy 6 MeV); They have relatively short half-lives of 162.8 days and 18.1 years and produce up to 120 W/g and
2.83 W/g thermal energy, respectively. Curium-242 oxide is used to produce compact and extremely powerful radioisotope energy sources. However, 242 Cm is very expensive (about 2000 US dollars per gram). Recently, the heavier isotope of curium, 244 Cm, has become increasingly popular. Since both of these isotopes are practically pure alpha emitters, the problem of radiation protection is not acute.
90 Sr. 90 Sr β-emitter with negligible γ-emission. Its half-life of 28.8 years is much shorter than that of 238 Pu. A chain of two β-decays (90 Sr → 90 Y → 90 Zr) gives a total energy of 2.8 MeV (one gram gives ~0.46 W). Because the energy output is lower, it reaches lower temperatures than 238 Pu, resulting in lower thermoelectric conversion efficiency. 90 Sr is a nuclear fission product and is available in large quantities at low cost. Strontium is a source of highly permeable ionizing radiation, which places relatively high demands on biological protection.
210 Po. 210 Po has a half-life of only 138 days with a huge initial heat release of 142 W/g. This is a practical pure alpha emitter. Due to its short half-life, 210 Po is not well suited for RTGs, but is used to create powerful and compact heat sources (Half a gram of polonium can heat up to 500 °C). Standard sources with a thermal power of 10 W were installed in spacecraft of the Cosmos type and on Lunokhods as a heat source to maintain the normal functioning of the equipment in the instrument compartment.
210 Po is also widely used where active antistatic is needed. Due to the short half-life, disposal of used 210 Po devices does not require any special measures. In the US, it is acceptable to throw them in a general purpose trash bin.
When using alpha-active isotopes with high specific energy release, it is often necessary to dilute the working isotope to reduce heat release. In addition, polonium is highly volatile, requiring the creation of a strong chemical compound with any element. Lead, yttrium, and gold are preferred as such elements, since they form refractory and durable polonides.
241 Am. Due to the shortage of 238 Pu, 241 Am can become an alternative to it as a fuel for RTGs. 241 Am has a half-life of 432 years. He is an almost pure alpha emitter. 241 Am is found in nuclear waste and is almost isotopically pure. However, the specific power of 241 Am is only 1/4 of that of 238 Pu. In addition, the decay products of 241 Am emit more penetrating radiation and better shielding is necessary. However, the radiation shielding requirements for 241 Am are not much more stringent than in the case of 238 Pu.
241 Am is widely used in smoke detectors. An ionization smoke detector uses a tiny piece of americium-241. The air-filled space between the two electrodes creates a chamber that allows a small amount of flow direct current between the electrodes. If smoke or heat enters the chamber, electricity between the electrodes is interrupted and an alarm is triggered. This smoke alarm is less expensive than other devices.
63 Ni. 63 Ni pure β - emitter. Maximum electron energy 67 keV, half-life 100.1 l. At the beginning of the 2000s, batteries based on 63 Ni were developed in the USA and Russia. The service life of the devices is more than 50 years, and the dimensions are less than one cubic millimeter. The beta-voltaic effect is used to generate electricity. Work is also underway to create a piezoelectric radioisotope generator. Similar batteries can be used in neuro- and cardiac pacemakers.
144 Ce. Heat source – 144 Ce. 144 Ce is a pure β − emitter. The half-life of 144 Ce is 285 days, the specific power for the pure isotope is 2.6 W/g. RTG is intended to power radio transmitters and automatic weather stations. Standard power 200 W.
Radioisotopes are widely used in a mixture with phosphorus to ensure a constant glow in control devices on board vehicles, in watches, lanterns at polar airfields and in navigational signs and even in Christmas tree toys. Previously, 226 Ra, which has a half-life of 1620 years, was most often used for this. However, for radiation safety reasons, radium has not been used for these purposes since the 1970s. Nowadays, soft beta emitters are most often used for these purposes: promethium (147 Pm T 1/2 = 2.64 years), krypton (85 Kr T 1/2 = 10.8 years) and tritium (3 H T 1/2 = 12.3 years ). Of course, their half-lives are short, but their ionizing radiation does not penetrate the shells of devices.

Encyclopedic YouTube

Subtitles

Application

In space

On the ground

Fuel

Ground RTGs in Russia

Requirements for RTG design

Incidents with RTGs in the CIS

see also

Notes

What is RTG

Radioactive element

Security issues

Yield of strontium-90

Owners and licensing

RTG models

RTG accounting

Where are the RTGs located?

Emergency RTG in Chukotka Autonomous Okrug: release of 90Sr into the environment

Emergency and abandoned RTGs

RTG incidents

Threat of terrorism

RTG Disposal Programs

US efforts

What is RTG

Radioactive element

Security issues

Yield of strontium-90

Owners and licensing

RTG models

RTG accounting

Where are the RTGs located?

Emergency RTG in Chukotka Autonomous Okrug: release of 90Sr into the environment

Emergency and abandoned RTGs

RTG incidents

Threat of terrorism

RTG Disposal Programs

US efforts

Radioisotope thermoelectric generators (radioisotope thermoelectric generator (RTG, RITEG)

Low-power and small-sized radioisotope power sources

Beta Voltaic Power Supplies (Betavoltaic power sources)

Piezoelectric radioisotope microelectric generator (The Radioisotope Thin-film Mkropower Generator)

Radioisotopes and their uses

Related materials:

Radioisotope thermoelectric generators
(radioisotope thermoelectric generator (RTG, RITEG)

Beta Voltaic Power Supplies
(Betavoltaic power sources)

Piezoelectric radioisotope microelectric generator
(The Radioisotope Thin-film Mkropower Generator)